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Abstract
We augment the standard career concerns model by introducing (i)
an action that blocks the information about the true state of the world
and (ii) the possibility that the principal might reverse her initial action
after receiving an interim news. In this model, the principal’s decisions
as well as the expert’s message endogenously determine the observability
of the states and consequently, the assessment of the expert’s ability by
the principal. We show that having access to better interim news could
reduce the welfare of the principal due to its strategic effect on the ex-
pert’s recommendation. We also discuss the implication of the results for
possible delegation of decision making to another person with different
preference parameters.
Keywords: Career Concerns, Reputational Cheaptalk, Signaling Game
JEL-Classification: D82, D83
1 Introduction
People seek advice from experts because one is likely to make a better choice
with the aid of professional knowledge. Economists, however, have argued that
it might not be in the experts’ interest to tell the truth if they do not share
∗We thank Kunal Sengupta for many very helpful suggestions and advices. Helpful com-
ments by Birendra Rai and seminar participants from the University of Sydney also gratefully
acknowledged.
1
the same preference with his client. In their seminal paper on cheap talk Craw-
ford and Sobel (1982) assume that, conditional on the state, an informed advi-
sor/expert’s preferred action is different from that of the principal. So experts
send biased recommendations to influence the principal’s action in favour of their
own preferences. Alternatively, the expert may have no interest in the princi-
pal’s actions, but care about his own reputation of being smart or competent
which is rewarded by markets. Efforts to appear smart might create incentive
for experts to distort their recommendation. A growing literature focuses on
the effects of this sort of ‘career concern’.1
Our paper is about the effect of a second opinion or an interim news in a
model of career concern. Given that some experts might be not well informed
and make wrong recommendations, the need for a second opinion arises quite
naturally in this context. We will use a stylised story to motivate the model but
its application is not confined to this particular setting. A government/principal
(hereafter ‘she’) wants to undertake a reform/action and consults an expert
(hereafter ‘he’) who has some information on the underlying state. The expert
may have better information (the H type) or be less well informed (the L type)
and only the expert knows his own type. Upon getting the expert’s advice, the
government decides whether to initiate the reform or maintain status quo. The
status quo would produce a state-independent return so that the government
cannot determine the expert’s quality by observing the return. The return of
the reform, however, depends on the underlying state. Hence, by observing the
return of the reform the government will have a better idea of the expert’s com-
petence. Some research works have investigated similar scenarios and found that
less well informed experts would want to hide their ignorance by recommending
the status quo2.
We extend beyond the existing work by introducing a second opinion/interim
news, and hence the possibility of reversing the reform in a principal-agent game
where the agent/expert has career concerns . If by reversing a wrong reform the
principal can recover some cost, then she would indeed care for a second opinion
if it is sufficiently precise. Suppose the principal gets an interim news that con-
tradicts the expert’s pro-reform recommendation and she reverts back to status
quo. But once the status quo is re-instated, she will not know for sure what the
true state is. Was the expert really wrong or is it the interim news/ second opin-
ion that is off the mark? From the expert’s perspective, the principal’s ability
to assess his quality changes with the presence of the second opinion. Therefore,
1This is not the only way career concerns has been modeled. Often a smart agent is
modeled as being more productive. See Holmstrom (1999) and Zwiebel (1995) for example.
2See Fu and Li (2010), Suurmond et al (2004), Song and Thakor (2006).
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one might expect the expert’s equilibrium strategy to change. Somewhat sur-
prisingly, our first finding is that the less well informed expert is more inclined
to recommend the reform when he knows that the principal could reverse it if
she got contradictory interim news.
The interaction between the principal and the expert endogenizes the observ-
ability of the state of the world. The principal’s action affects how accurately
she is able to judge the expert’s quality, which in turn affects the expert’s re-
porting strategy, and consequently, the principal’s welfare. In the second part
of our investigation, we explore when it is indeed beneficial for the principal
to have access to interim news. To keep things simple and get sharp intuition,
we assume that the interim news, though it may be of different qualities, is
transmitted non-strategically. We show that the principal’s welfare does not
necessarily improve by using an interim source of information. In particular, it
goes down if the mediocre expert’s information is of low quality and the interim
news is of intermediate precision (although it is still good enough so that the
principal follows it). Further, marginal increases in the precision of the interim
news will continue to have ambiguous effect on the principal’s welfare.
The model generates another line of enquiry. It shows that the strategy of
experts is based on their reading of what the principal would decide about the
reform/action- both initially and also after getting the interim news. Therefore,
the principal might be better off by pre-committing not to entertain any interim
news, although after the expert’s recommendation, such news could help her
make better choices. Following this line of reasoning we explore the possibility of
delegation when it is institutionally feasible. If it is possible to publicly delegate
the decision-making rights to another player with a different preference profile,
would it improve the principal’s welfare?3
In the early literature on information games, eg. Sobel (1985), Be´nabou
and Laroque (1992) etc, ‘good’ experts were assumed to always tell the truth.
By contrast, if experts behave strategically so that signals are endogenous,
there could be an adverse effect on the principal’s payoffs. This issue has
been explored in a variety of model structures starting from the early 1980s,
eg. Ho¨lmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986), Sobel (1985), Scharfstein and Stein
(1990), Ho¨lmstrom (1999) etc. Endogenous signalling arises from two sources.
In works like Crawford and Sobel (1982) or Morris (2001) it appears from the
preference of the agent (expert) for a particular action or outcome. In our model
endogenous signals arise because the expert is judged by the signal and the judg-
3Sengupta and Sanyal (2008) has explored the possibility of this kind of delegation in the
context of a different model.
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ment influences the agent’s future earnings. (For example, see Ottaviani and
Sorensen (2006).)
A number of contributions have appeared in the last two decades using sig-
naling games in the career concern literature. They have produced variegated
insights depending on the model structure and assumptions. Zwiebel’s (1995)
paper models agents/experts with varying productivity rather than varying sig-
nal precision. He finds that agents with very high and very low ability pick up
unconventional tasks while agents of intermediate ability stick to the conven-
tional ones. Levy (2004) finds that in order to signal their type, better informed
agents tend to contradict the commonly held prior belief excessively. Suurmond
et al (2004) show that an agent’s reputational concerns might increase social
welfare if it induces him to exert more effort in gathering information. Fu and
Li (2010) investigates a model where low quality politicians might initiate detri-
mental reforms and studies optimal institution design to curb such initiatives.
To the best of our knowledge, in the literature on career concern models
where the expert’s reputation is determined by the accuracy of his information,
ours is the first signaling game where the interaction between the principal and
the expert is crucial due to the unobservability of the states when the status
quo is chosen. In related papers such as Suurmond et al (2004) and Fu and Li
(2010), the expert himself is also the decision maker and there is no possibility of
reversing a previous action. Introducing a separate “principal” in their work will
not make much qualitative difference, because as long as the principal follows
the expert’s advice (i.e., in the “informative equilibria”), the outcome is the
same as the game where the expert makes the decision himself. Our model
shares a common feature with Majumdar and Mukand (2004) in that there is
the possibility of reversing the reform. They show that the expert tends to stick
to the reform even if he gets a bad interim news. In their model, however, again
the expert himself is the decision maker and thus their results and focus are
quite different from ours.
Two other models on reputation concerns should be mentioned where se-
quential reporting is involved.4 Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001) asks in a situa-
tion of sequential debates, whether it is better to let the smarter agent speak
first. Li (2007) studies a model where the expert gets two signals over the time
and reports them to the principal as they arrive. In both papers, the first mes-
sage is always transmitted honestly as following his own signal is the best bet
4Models with sequential messages by multiple experts have been extensively studied in
the more conventional cheaptalk literature in line with Crawford and Sobel(1982). See, for
example Krishna and Morgan (2001) and Battaglini (2003).
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the expert can take. Thus the focus is on how later messages are distorted.
Our model studies exactly the opposite problem. We assume that the second
message is truthfully transmitted, but the way the principal reacts to it will
affect the expert’s incentive in truthfully transmitting the first message.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the main model
environment, assumptions and present some preliminary results in Section 2. In
the same section, we also develop a model where, unlike in our central model,
the state of the world is always observable. This model is used as a benchmark
against which the intuition of the central model is presented. Section 3 analyses
the central model where the status quo choice does not reveal the true state. We
characterise the expert’s reporting strategy in the informative equilibria (formal
definition in section 2) and develop their parameter restrictions. In Section 4
we investigate the welfare implication of the interim news for the principal.
The central question explored is when is the existence of interim news welfare-
enhancing. The possibility of delegation of decision making rights arises as a
sequel to this discussion. Section 5 investigates various robustness aspects of
the main result. (Appendix C also contains a detailed study of the symmetric
information version of the model.) Section 6 offers some concludes remarks. All
proofs are placed in appendix A and B.
2 The Model
2.1 Timing
The government/principal has an opportunity to undertake a reform. In state
ω = 1, the reform will be successful and the principal gets a return of Y = 1.
In state ω = 0, the reform fails and the return is Y = −c (c > 0). Alternatively,
she can keep the status quo, in which the return is independent of the states
and is normalized to Y=0. In the central model, we assume that the common
prior pi = 12 so that each state is equally like. We will show in section 5 that
the assumption is not necessary for our main results, but it helps sharpen the
intuition. At the time of deciding whether to initiate the reform, the principal
may consult an expert, who receives a private signal s ∈ {0, 1}. The expert can
have high quality information (i=H) or be less well informed (i=L). The smart
expert gets perfect information about the state so that Pr(s = ω|H) = 1. The
low type expert’s information is noisy, so that 1 > Pr(s = ω|L) = p > 12 . Only
the expert knows his own type, but it is common knowledge that a proportion
r ∈ (0, 1) of experts are smart. The expert sends a message to the principal
from m ∈ {0, 1}. Since the state space is binary, there is no loss of generality in
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making the message space binary, too. We formally denote by tis : {0, 1} 7→ [0, 1]
the i-type expert’s strategy, which is the probability that the i-type expert
reports m = 1 when he gets s.
Upon receiving the expert’s message, the principal decides whether to initiate
the reform (x1 = 1) or not (x1 = 0). If the principal keeps up the status quo
(x1 = 0), then no more action or information is available and the game ends
with the return Y = 0. If she starts the reform, she has to pay a non-refundable
initiation cost k ∈ (0, 1). It takes a while for the outcome of the reform to
be fully realised. In the meantime, the principal will receive an interim news
n ∈ {g, b} about the prospect of the reform. (We will be more explicit about
the interim news in a later section.) If the state is ω = 0 (so that the reform
will indeed fail), the interim news is always bad, so that Pr(n = g|ω = 0) = 0.
On the other hand, even if ω = 1, the interim news will be good only with
probability β ∈ [0, 1]. That is, Pr(n = g|ω = 1) = β.5 After getting the interim
news, the principal can choose to persist with the reform (x2 = 1) or revert back
to the status quo (x2 = 0). If she persists with the reform her return depends
on the actual state. If she reverts back to the status quo, then Y = 0. (Note
that the initiation cost k is sunk.) We summarize the timing of the game here:
1. The experts sees his type i and signal s and sends a message m to the
principal.
2. The principal decides whether to start the reform. If so (x1 = 1), she pays
the non-refundable initiation cost k. Otherwise (x1 = 0) no more action
or information is forthcoming.
3. If x1 = 1, the principal receives an interim news of precision β, and decides
whether to continue with the reform. (x2 = 1 if continued, x2 = 0 if
cancelled.)
4. The return (depending on the state and the principal’s actions) is realised.
The players receive their payoff. (See the next subsection.)
2.2 Payoffs
We assume that the principal cares only about the profitability of the project.
Hence her payoff is given by
W = Y − kR
5We assume this particular asymmetric structure for the interim news because the calcu-
lation is easier. The results do not change qualitatively even if one assumes that errors in the
interim news are symmetric.
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where R = 1 if and only if the principal chooses to initiate the reform after the
expert’s report (x1 = 1). Otherwise R = 0.
The expert on the other hand cares about his reputation. We define the
expert’s reputation, rˆ, as the posterior probability that the principal thinks
that he is of H type at the end of the game. This is a common measure of
reputation in the career concern literature, where it is usually assumed that the
agent’s future wage is positively correlated with rˆ. We do not explicitly model
any future periods, and for the sake of simplicity, assume that the expert’s payoff
is linear in his posterior reputation,6 so that for both types of expert,
U = rˆ
Of course, the posterior reputation rˆ is derived from all available information the
principal has at the end of the game. In particular, it might include the message
sent by the expert, the observed output (and hence the principal’s knowledge
on the state) and the interim news received (conditional on the reform being
initiated at the beginning).
We may briefly comment on some of our modelling choices. We assume that
the H-type expert gets a perfectly informative signal to simplify our calculation.
The characterisation of informative equilibria (see below) remains qualitatively
unchanged if the H-type expert also gets a noisy signal. For more details,
please refer to Appendix B. We also assume that the expert cares only about
his reputation, but including some small outcome concern in his payoff does
not qualitatively change the main results. Section 5 contains a more detailed
discussion on this. The assumption that only the expert knows his own type,
however, is important to some of our results. This is common in the literature,
because the model is essentially a signalling game when the expert alone knows
his own type. (See, for example, Levy (2004) and Li (2007).). We will investigate
what happens when there is symmetric informationin in Appendix C.
2.3 Equilibrium selection
We look for (weak) PBE of the game. It is known that reputational cheap talk
games can have a wide range of PBE; hence some selection criteria need to be
imposed. First, we will restrict attention to equilibria that are “informative”.
That is, we rule out babbling equilibria where, for example, all experts send
messages randomly regardless of their signals. This obviously is an equilibrium
6It can be easily checked that our qualitative results will go through if the expert is risk
averse. Our result is also robust if the expert is not “too risk-loving”. See Li (2007), Effinger
and Polborn (2001) for models that explicitly derive the reputation payoff function.
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as all messages are taken to be meaningless, so the principal’s posterior assess-
ment of the agent remains the same as the prior and no deviation is possible.
An equilibrium is “informative” if it satisfies the following two conditions:
1. The principal’s belief on the state depends on the messages sent.
2. There is a positive probability that at the end of the game, rˆ 6= r.
To understand the importance of the second condition, note that there exists
an equilibrium where the first condition is met, but the principal will never
change her posterior assessment of the agents. To see the intuition, let the
L-type expert always truthfully report his signal. But let the H-type expert
always report truthfully his signal with probability p. Clearly the condition 1 is
met as the messages sent are still correlated with the true state. However, both
experts are equally likely to make a wrong recommendation in equilibrium, thus
the principal’s posterior assessment of the expert’s quality must always remain
the same as the prior. Therefore no expert has an incentive to deviate. There
are many reasonable justification one can use to rule out this type of equilibrium.
For example, suppose the expert needs to pay an arbitrarily small cost in order
to obtain his information. However, given that in equilibrium, whether the
prediction matches the true state or not does not affect the posterior reputation,
the expert would deviate and randomly make an announcement without paying
to be informed.
It is commonly assumed in cheap talk games that the players know the exact
“meaning” of the messages. Hence we will ignore mirror equilibria where one
simply re-labels the messages. We also restrict attention to equilibria where
the principal uses pure strategies. It is possible that in some equilibria, the
principal might randomize over her initiation or cancellation choices. Including
those equilibira does not bring much more insight but significantly complicates
the discussion.7
2.4 Preliminaries
Before we start the formal analysis, it is useful to note the following result about
informative equilibria. It can be shown that in any informative equilibrium, the
H-type expert will always truthfully report his signal. Note that this result
7In those potential mixed strategy equilibria, the principal’s randomization choices must
be credible ex post. This means that the intuition we gain in equilibria where she uses pure
strategies will still go through. If the principal can pre-commit to some ex post inefficient
actions (or randomization) at the beginning of the game, there will be interesting changes to
our results. In fact, we probe into this kind of possibility when discussing delegation.
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holds even if the H-type expert gets a noisy signal or if the principal randomises
over some decisions. We present the proof of the lemma in a general setting
incorporating these additional features in Appendix B.
Lemma 1 In any informative equilibrium, the H-type expert must truthfully
report his signals.
After receiving the expert’s message, the principal updates her belief on the
state. We let αm denote the principal’s posterior assessment that ω = 1 after
getting message m. Following our definition of informative equilibria and the
assumption that messages have their natural meanings, we must have α1 >
1
2 >
α0 in equilibrium.
If the principal gets m, she will start the reform if and only if
max{αm − (1− αm)c− k, αmβ − k} ≥ 0 (1)
The first expression on the LHS is the principal’s expected payoff if she starts the
reform after m = 1 and persists with it. The second expression is her expected
payoff if she starts the reform after m = 1, but reverts back to the status quo
after getting a bad interim news. Note that αm − (1− αm)c− k ≥ αmβ − k if
and only if
β ≥ 1− (1− αm)c
αm
. (2)
Of course, in equilibrium, αm depends on the strategy of the expert. Thus, once
the reform is initiated, the principal will revert back to the status quo after a
bad news if and only if the news is sufficiently precise.
Before presenting our main model, it will be useful to develop the standard
case where the state always gets revealed regardless of the principal’s actions.
We will use this case as a benchmark to contrast our later results against it.
It will clarify the role of status quo, which produces no knowledge about the
state of the world in the signalling game. In this benchmark case, when as-
sessing the quality of the expert, the principal would ignore the interim news
and simply compare the expert’s recommendation with the true state. We can
show that Lemma 1 will still apply (see the proof in appendix B) and the H-
type expert will always truthfully report his signal. Since the H type expert
is more likely to get the correct signal, the principal’s posterior assessment of
the expert would be higher if it turns out to be correct. On the other hand, a
wrong recommendation lowers the principal’s opinion on the expert. (In fact,
to rˆ = 0 given our assumption.) Now consider the L-type expert’s incentive.
If he reports his signals truthfully, his advice will match the true state with
probability p. Since p > 12 , he indeed prefers to report his signals truthfully.
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Note that the interim news has no effect on the expert’s reporting strategy if
the state is always revealed.
Hence, together with Lemma 1, the following proposition summarises the
experts’ equilibrium strategy. Note that this equilibrium is unique so far as the
experts’ strategies are concerned.
Proposition 1 In the informative equilibrium, the L-type expert always truth-
fully reports his signals when the state is revealed regardless of the principal’s
action.
3 The State is not Revealed in Status Quo
To keep the discussion tractable, we assume from now on that the initiation cost
k > 12 in the central model. Given the equal prior assumption, it implies that in
any informative equilibrium, the principal will start the reform only if she gets
m = 1. This means that there could be only two types of informative equilibria.
In the first one, the principal starts the reform after m = 1 and continues
with it regardless of the interim news (hereafter called CE for Continuation
Equilibrium). In the other one, the principal starts the reform after m = 1, but
reverts back to the status quo if and only if the interim news is bad (hereafter
called DE for Discontinuation Equilibrium).8 This assumption is reasonable
because it implies an environment where there is substantial cost at stake and
the expert’s advice is crucial to the principal’s choice. In section 5, we will
briefly investigate the case where k ≤ 12 .
3.1 Continuation Equilibrium (CE)
Since the return is independent of the states in the status quo, the principal will
not know the true state if she ever chooses status quo. Hence, one would expect
that the L-type expert will be more inclined to recommend the status quo in
order to conceal his ignorance. We start with the simpler case of continuation
equilibrium, where the precision of the interim news is low, so that once the
reform is initiated, the principal will never revert back. For the time being, we
8One might wonder whether there are informative equilibria that satisfy the two criteria
above, but the principal never chooses to initiate the reform. The answer is negative. Here is a
sketch of the intuition: Suppose such an equilibrium indeed exists. Given the principal never
starts the reform, her assessment of the expert after each message m, is unique. But this must
imply that in equilibrium, both m = 0 or m = 1 induce the same assessment. Otherwise, the
expert would deviate and report the m that induces a more favourable opinion. Now criterion
2 is violated.
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bypass the existence problem and concentrate on the equilibrium strategy of the
experts.
The H-type expert tells the truth by Lemma 1. But, we will show that
the L-type expert cannot always report his signal truthfully in the CE. To see
the intuition, suppose both types of experts truthfully report their signals. If
m = 0, the principal will not start the reform and so will never get to know the
true state. Given that the expert of either type would be telling the truth, the
principal’s posterior on expert type must remain unchanged following m = 0.
Thus the low type expert’s payoff from reporting m = 0 is UL = rˆ = r. On
the other hand, if the L-type expert truthfully reports his s = 1 signal, the
principal will carry out the reform and a wrong recommendation will surely
be found out. Intuitively, since he knows that he is of low type, the expert’s
expected posterior reputation will be lower than the prior. Therefore, he would
strictly prefer deviating and report m = 0 instead. In fact, we can show that in
the CE, the L-type expert always truthfully reports his s = 0 signal, but when
he gets s = 1, he reports m = 0 with positive probability.
Given the experts’ reporting strategy, the principal’s belief on the state after
m = 1 is
αc∗1 (t
c∗
L1) =
r + (1− r)ptc∗L1
r + (1− r)tc∗L1
(3)
Of course, her belief after m = 0 must be αc∗0 <
1
2 , as discussed in the prelim-
inary part. Also note that it is necessary that in the continuation equilibrium
β is sufficiently low so that β ≤ 1 − (1−αc∗1 )cαc∗1 . We summarize the result in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 In a continuation equilibrium, the L-type expert truthfully re-
ports s = 0 but mis-reports s = 1 with positive probability. That is, tc∗L1 < 1.
3.2 Discontinuation Equilibrium (DE)
Suppose now that the interim news is sufficiently precise, so that the principal
will cancel the reform if she gets a bad news. If the principal reverts back to
the status quo, she will receive a return of 0 and will not be able to know the
state for sure (unless β = 1). If the L-type expert truthfully reports his s = 1
signal, with probability pβ the principal knows that his suggestion is correct.
With probability of 1− pβ, the principal will get a bad interim news and cancel
the reform. As in the continuation equilibrium, we can show that the L-type
expert always tells the truth when s = 0 and misreports s = 1 with positive
probability in the discontinuation equilibrium too.
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An interesting question is whether or not the L-type expert will recommend
the reform more often in the DE. We can show that td∗L1 ≥ tc∗L1. So the answer
is yes. Recall that the H type expert always tells the truth, but the L type
expert misreports s = 1 with positive probability in equilibrium. Given equal
prior, this means that, ex ante, the H type expert is more likely to send m = 1.
Hence the L type expert has an incentive to mimic such action when s = 1.
However, it is costly for him to do so because a wrong recommendation lowers
his posterior reputation. In the CE, the principal can always be sure when a
pro-reform recommendation is mistaken. But in the DE, if the principal cancels
the reform, she will not know with certainty whether the expert was indeed
wrong. Hence the L-type expert finds it more attractive to recommend the
reform in the DE. In fact, conditional on the existence of the DE, when β is
smaller, the principal is less sure about the true state after the cancellation, and
consequently the incentive for the L-type expert to send m = 1 becomes higher.
On the other hand, if β = 1, even if the principal cancels the reform, she would
know for sure that the expert had fouled up. Hence td∗L1 = t
c∗
L1 if β = 1.
Given the expert’s strategy, the principal’s posterior belief on the state,
following m = 1 is
αd∗1 (t
d∗
L1) =
r + (1− r)ptd∗L1
r + (1− r)td∗L1
(4)
Note that αd∗1 ≤ αc∗1 because td∗L1 ≥ tc∗L1. Also it is necessary that in a discontin-
uation equilibrium, we have β > 1− (1−αd∗1 )c
αd∗1
.
Proposition 3 In a discontinuation equilibrium,
1. the L-type expert truthfully reports s = 0 and misreports s = 1 with positive
probability (td∗L1 < 1);
2. the L-type expert reports m = 1 more often than in the CE. That is,
td∗L1 ≥ tc∗L1, with strict inequality holding if β < 1;
3. the L-type expert reports m = 1 more often if the interim news is less
precise. That is, ∂td∗L1/∂β < 0.
3.3 Existence of Informative Equilibria
We now take up the question of the existence of informative equilibria (when
the principal uses pure strategies). Recall that given our assumption k > 12 , the
principal carries out the reform if and only if m = 1 in any informative equi-
librium. We have noted that in both CE and DE, equilibrium strategies of the
expert are uniquely determined. (For the detailed characterisation, please refer
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to the proofs in the appendix.) It is necessary for the existence of informative
equilibria that, given the experts’ strategies, the principal indeed carries out the
reform if m = 1. (See footnote 8 for a more detailed discussion.) Therefore, if
an informative equilibrium exists, it is necessary that at least one of the two
following inequalities is satisfied:
αc∗1 − (1− αc∗1 )c− k ≥ 0⇔ αc∗1 ≥
c+ k
1 + c
αd∗1 β − k ≥ 0⇔ αd∗1 ≥
k
β
So, contrary to the benchmark case, the existence of informative equilibria is not
guaranteed if the state is not revealed following some choice of action. Indeed,
both αc∗1 and α
d∗
1 are bounded away from 1 for all p >
r
2−r . (See proofs of
the previous propositions. They also show that the experts’ strategies and
hence both αc∗1 and α
d∗
1 are independent of k.) If k → 1, then no informative
equilibrium is viable as the principal will never carry out the reform.
In addition, the existence of CE requires
β ≤ β1 = 1− (1− α
c∗
1 )c
αc∗1
(5)
while that of DE requires
β > β0 = 1− (1− α
d∗
1 )c
αd∗1
(6)
Note that β1 and β0 depend on p and we have β1 ≥ β0 as αc∗1 ≥ αd∗1 . (Recall
that when the state is not revealed after the choice of status quo, td∗L1 > t
c∗
L1 for
all β < 1; in the benchmark case, td∗L1 = t
c∗
L1 = 1 ).
In general, the existence of the informative equilibria in relation to the value
of exogenous parameters such as β could be a messy issue. For example, it
is possible that if β is low, a CE exists. When β increases so that β > β1, by
construction the CE is no longer viable. However, the DE might not exist either,
because it is possible that αd∗1 <
k
β . Therefore, to simplify the discussions that
follow we make two assumptions on the parameters for the rest of the paper:
Assumption 1 r + (1− r)p > c+k1+c .
Assumption 2 p > r2−r .
Assumption 1 guarantees that an informative equilibrium always exists for
all β. To see the intuition, note that the LHS is the lowest possible α∗1 in
equilibrium when the L-type expert always tells the truth. On the other hand,
13
the RHS represents the highest threshold α∗1 needed by the principal to carry
out the reform when no interim news is available.9 Assumption 2 guarantees
that in the CE, the L-type expert reports m = 1 with positive probability. (See
the proof for proposition 2 for detail.) We can now summarise the existence of
informative equilibrium in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Let β0 and β1 be defined in (5) and (6). For all β ∈ (0, β0]
there exists a unique CE; for β ∈ (β0, β1) both the CE and the DE exist; and,
for β ∈ (β1, 1), there exists a unique DE.
One might wonder whether a similar conclusion can be drawn regarding p,
the precision of the L-type expert’s information. Does an increase in p make
CE more likely? The answer is, not necessarily. In equilibrium, the principal’s
belief α∗1 is not monotonic in p. This is because an increase in p also causes the
L type expert to be more confident and report m = 1 more often. (See proof of
proposition 2 for details.) The direct effect of higher p and the strategic effect on
the expert’s message work in opposite directions. For example, when p→ r2−r ,
the L type expert is very unlikely to report m = 1 and hence α∗1 → 1, but as p
increases to some intermediate value, he reports m = 1 more often and α∗1 < 1.
Thus it is possible that the principal is more likely to cancel a reform when p
is higher.
4 Interim News, Welfare and Delegation
We will explore several questions in this section. The first question consists of
two parts: (1) if the principal has a choice of accessing or not accessing the
interim news, when is it beneficial to do so? (2) Assuming the existence of the
interim news is exogenously given and the players are in the discontinuation
equilibrium. Does an increase in β always leads to a higher payoff for the
principal? These queries will lead to the second question about the possibility of
delegation, i.e., the principal entrusting the decision making to another player
with difference preferences and hence pre-committing to a particular line of
action.
9To see this formally, let αL = r + (1 − r)p and define βL = 1 − (1−αL)cαL . Clearly, a
continuation equilibrium exists for all β ≤ β1. For all β ≥ β0, note that we have β > βL.
Since αd∗1 > αL, a discontinuation equilibrium exists because
αd∗1 β > αLβL
= αL(1 + c)− c > k
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To appreciate the the first question, we should explain what we mean by
‘the choice of accessing an interim news’. People seek a second opinion if in
doubt about the initial advice they had received when starting off an action. In
case of governments, interim news can arise from parliamentary, bureaucratic
or independent civic committees for monitoring reforms. Second opinions also
arise from expert services, opinion polls, from the media and so on. There
are many examples in the context of private decisions, too. For example, a
patient often seeks a second doctor’s or surgeon’s opinion after starting on a
course of medication recommended by his/her doctor. Business houses seek
second opinion from law firms and accounting firms as they progress through a
course of action recommended by inhouse experts. A government can publicly
commit to use an interim news by setting up appropriate statutory institutions.
In the opposite case it may set up procedures that do not look for or use a
second opinion or interim news. The interim news or the second opinion will be
assumed to be a non-strategic and truthful message, so that its precision β is
exogenous.10
To proceed, we can imagine as if there was an extra “Stage 0” before the
game started. At stage 0, the principal publicly makes an irreversible decision
on whether to gain access to the interim news. (For example, the government
decides whether to set up an independent monitoring committee that that would
report the progress of the reform.) First assume that the principal chooses not
to do so at Stage 0, so that β = 0. Given Assumption 1 of the previous section,
we know that there is a unique CE where the expert’s equilibrium strategy is
given by tc∗L . Given this strategy, the principal would have been better off with
the interim news if and only if
β > β1 = 1− (1− α
c∗
1 )c
αc∗1
(7)
However, if the principal had committed to use the interim news, that would
also have changed the equilibrium strategy of the expert. We know from the
last proposition that for all β > β1, there is only one unique DE. Therefore, it
is not immediately clear whether the principal is better off by setting up the
interim news at Stage 0.
It will be clear from the following discussion that the question concerns with
the change in the principal’s payoff when use of the interim news causes a switch
from a CE to a DE. Hence it leaves open the question as to whether a higher
10It would be interesting to assume that the source of the interim news also has reputation
concerns just like the expert. In this case, the ‘error’ in the interim news might not be
symmetric and needs to be endogenously derived. Unfortunately this comes at the cost of
significantly complicating the model and we will stick to the ‘exogenous error’ version.
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β will lead to a higher payoff in the discontinuation equilibrium itself. For
concreteness, one can imagine that the existence of the interim news is exoge-
nously given. For example, there is an independent media and the government is
obliged to appear to be sensitive to media reports. Further, assume that β > β1,
so that the unique equilibrium is DE. Given this setting, we may investigate if it
is always true that the principal will be strictly better off if there is a marginal
increase in β.
4.1 If the state is always revealed
Recall that if the state is always revealed, both experts always tell the truth.
Let
q1(t
∗
L1) = r
1
2
+ (1− r)1
2
[pt∗L1 + (1− p)t∗L1] =
1
2
(r + (1− r)t∗L1) (8)
denote the probability of the principal receiving m = 1. We write q as a function
of t∗L1 only, because other signals are always truthfully reported (even when the
state is not revealed). In this benchmark case, t∗L1 = 1 and q =
1
2 . When the
principal does not have access to the interim news, her expected payoff is
W = Wc = q1(t
∗
L1)[α
∗
1 − (1− α∗1)c− k] (9)
On the other hand, if she has access to interim news, her expected payoff be-
comes
W = max{Wc,Wd}
where
Wd = q1(t
∗
L1)[α
∗
1β − k] (10)
When the state is always revealed, answer to question (i) posed at the beginning
of this section is straightforward. The experts’ recommendations are indepen-
dent of the interim news. The principal can ignore the interim news if it is not
precise enough. On the other hand, when eq(7) is satisfied, the principal bene-
fits by avoiding a possible failure by following the interim news. In other words,
Wc is unaffected by β but Wd strictly increases with it. Thus the principal is
never hurt by a more accurate interim news, and strictly benefits from it in the
DE.
Proposition 5 1. In the benchmark case, having access to the interim news
never hurts the principal for all β and strictly benefits her when eq(7) is
satisfied.
2. A marginal increase in β never hurts the principal, and strictly improves
her welfare if and only if eq(7) is satisfied.
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4.2 The state is not observable in status quo
If the state is not observable with the choice of status quo, the result changes
drastically because of the change in the expert’s equilibrium strategy. We know
from the previous result that td∗L > t
c∗
L so that the L type expert recommends
the reform more often in the DE. From (9) and (10), we have
∂Wc
∂tc∗L1
≥ 0 if and only if p ≥ c+ k
1 + c
and
∂Wd
∂td∗L1
≥ 0 if and only if p ≥ k
β
These results mean that in both types of equilibria, the principal prefers the
L-type expert to truthfully report his s = 1 signal if and only if his precision p
is sufficiently high. The following paragraphs explain the intuition.
In both types of equilibria, the principal starts the reform if and only if
m = 1. But if the reform is suggested by the L-type expert, it is ‘correct’ only
with probability p. Even the DE equilibrium is not costless for the principal
who has to incur the initiation cost which becomes sunk. Hence, if p is too low,
the principal would want the L-type expert not to recommend the reform at
all. On the other hand, if p is suitably large, the principal’s expected payoff is
positive if she decides to reform following even the L-type expert’s signal. In
this case, the principal would like him to transmit his signals always truthfully.
Recall that, at a value of β just above β1, a CE is no longer possible. How-
ever, given the expert’s CE strategy tc∗L1, the principal is indifferent between
cancelling the reform or continuing with it. Therefore, any change in her wel-
fare must come from changes in the expert’s strategy, i.e. from tc∗L1 to t
d∗
L1. We
have shown that the principal benefits from a higher t∗L1 in the DE if and only
if pβ > k. Therefore, when p is small the principal can be hurt if the precision
of the interim news, too, is intermediate. By reversing this argument, when p
is sufficiently large, the principal would prefer the L-type expert to truthfully
recommend the reform more often. The following proposition formally states
these observations.
Proposition 6 1. When p ≤ k, there exists some 0 > 0 such that, the
principal’s welfare is strictly lower when she has access to an interim news
if and only if β ∈ (β1, β1 + 0).
2. When p ≥ c+k1+c , having access to the interim news will strictly improve the
principal’s welfare whenever β > β1.
If the state is not observable in the status quo, the principal will surely be
worse off if the L-type expert’s quality is poor and the precision of interim
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news too is not far above β1. On the other hand, if the expert’s quality is
sufficiently good, having access to any interim news above β1 will strictly benefit
the principal. But what happens to interim news with β < β1? Clearly, for all
β < β0, having access to the interim news or not does not affect the principal’s
welfare as only a CE is possible. For β ∈ (β0, β1), the answer is uncertain as
multiple equilibria exist in this case. If the principal decides to use interim news
at stage 0, but the players still “coordinate” on the CE, again there will be no
effect on the principal’s welfare. But suppose the players “coordinate” on the
DE, then following the explanation in the preceding paragraphs, the principal
is strictly worse off whenever p < k. If p > c+k1+c , since the principal is better off
at β = β1, by continuity she is still better off when β is just below β1.
Remark 1 Let β ∈ (β0, β1), and the players coordinate on the DE if the prin-
cipal gains access to the interim news.
1. If p ≤ k, the principal is strictly worse off by gaining access to the interim
news.
2. If p ≥ c+k1+c , there exists some 1 > 0 such that for all β ∈ (β1− 1, β1), the
principal is strictly better off by gaining access to the interim news.
Combining the above observations, we see that by committing to use interim
news, the principal is strictly better off only if the quality of the interim news
and the L type expert are sufficiently good. If the L type expert’s information
is very coarse and the interim news is of intermediate quality, the principal can
be worse off using the interim news. (Note that the result in proposition 6 does
not depend on the multiplicity of equilibria.)
The discussion provides an interesting observation. Suppose the principal
chooses not to set up the interim news at stage 0. In that case, given the
expert’s strategy tc∗L1, she will miss consulting an interim news after initiating
the reform if β > β1. However, had she set up the interim news at stage 0, she
would actually be worse off when p < k and β is not too far above β1. On the
other hand, when β < β1, given the expert’s reporting strategy t
c∗
L1, the interim
news is useless to the principal. However, when p > c+k1+c , the principal would be
better off by setting up the interim news and “coordinate” with the expert on
the DE, when β is not too far below β1. These peculiarities do not arise in the
benchmark case. When the state is always revealed regardless of the actions,
the principal is strictly better off to set up the interim news at stage 0 if and
only if after the expert’s report, she finds the news useful. When the state is
not revealed following some action choice, the effects arise from the change of
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experts’ strategy when interim news is used. We will discuss more about this
issue in the delegation part below.
We may wonder what happens to intermediate level p ∈ (k, c+k1+c )? Although
the same intuition still carries through, the answer is less clear-cut. This is
because whether the principal is better off when the “switch” between equilibria
happens depends on whether pβ1 > k. (See the proof for proposition 6 for
detail.) Recall that β1 changes with p because the latter affects the principal’s
belief αc∗1 . We have noted at the end of the previous section that α
c∗
1 is not
necessarily monotonic in p. Therefore, how the value of pβ1 changes with p is
also uncertain. However, we can show that there exists some r∗ 11 such that for
all r < r∗, αc∗1 and consequently pβ1 strictly increase with p. Thus, for r < r
∗
we have the following more general result.
Corollary 1 Assume r < r∗. There exists a unique pˆ ∈ (k, c+k1+c ) such that,
1. When β > β1,
for all p < pˆ, the principal will be strictly worse off by having access to
some intermediate quality interim news just above β1. For all p > pˆ,
the principal will be strictly better off by having access to all news with
β > β1.
12
2. When β ∈ (β0, β1) and the players coordinate on the DE,
for all p < pˆ, the principal will be strictly worse off by having access to
the interim news. For all p > pˆ, there exists some 
′
1 such that for all
β ∈ (β1 − ′1, β1), the principal will be strictly better off by having access
to the interim news.
The next question is whether the principal benefits from a marginal increase
in β. When β is close to β1, marginally increasing it might cause the equilibrium
to switch from CE to DE and we have already discussed the welfare implication.
Hence we focus on the marginal change in DE itself. We have
∂Wd
∂β
=
1
2
[r + (1− r)ptd∗L1] +
1
2
(1− r)(pβ − k)∂t
d∗
L1
∂β
(11)
11r∗ is somewhere around 0.47. We can show that the necessary and sufficient condition for
∂αc∗1
∂p
> 0 is
r <
2p
(1− p)2 [
√
1 + (1− p)2 − 1]
The RHS is increasing in p for all p ∈ (0.5, 1) and the minimum of the RHS when p = 0.5 is
just over 0.47.
12We would like to note that in the first part of Proposition 6, the set of β above β1 that
makes the principal strictly worse off when p ≤ k is convex. The same is not true in this case.
This is because, when p > k, it is not necessarily true that Wd is monotonically increasing in
β, which is discussed in detail in the following paragraph.
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The sign of this expression is uncertain, because
∂td∗L1
∂β < 0. On the one hand,
increasing β means that a profitable reform is cancelled less often. However, the
second part of the expression says that the L-type expert will be less likely to
recommend a reform, which decreases the principal’s payoff if pβ is sufficiently
large. Note that if p < k, the second effect is always positive, since in this case,
the principal always prefers the L-type expert not to send m = 1. We do not
want to impose too many restrictions on the parameters (in particular, on those
concerning
∂td∗L1
∂β ), but it is interesting to note that if p and β are already large,
the principal might not wish β to improve further since it will adversely affect
the incentive of the L-type expert.
4.3 Delegation
In this section, we take up the second listed at the beginning of this section.
We reason that the principal might be better off if she can pre-commit to a
particular choice of action after receiving the interim news.
We have seen that if the state is not observable after status quo choice, the
principal can be sometimes worse off with a better interim news. This occurs
because she can not commit to carry out the reform to the end if the interim
news is unfavorable. Her inability to continue with the reform makes it more
attractive for the L-type expert to send the reform message, which is a signal
of smartness in the model. We have seen that this can hurt the principal if p
is small. On the other hand, when p is sufficiently large, the principal actually
wants to encourage the L-type expert to recommend the reform. But if β is not
large enough, the players could be stuck in a continuation equilibrium since,
given the expert’s reporting strategy tc∗L1, the principal will not cancel the reform
after a bad news. It appears that the principal could escape these constraints
by precommitting to particular actions. One natural mechanism for this would
be to delegate the decision rights to another decision maker who has a different
cost of failure.
Imagine a government that is deciding about a potential reform. The govern-
ment has an expert (or a department) to provide advice and another institution
that will provide interim news of quality β if the reform is started. There is a
(continuous) pool of potential decision makers who share the same benefit and
initiation cost as the principal (the government), but differ in terms of their
respective failure cost cj , which is distributed over [0, c1]. We assume that the
principal’s failure cost c < c1 and retain Assumptions 1 and 2. We know from
the last proposition that if p < k and β is just above β1, switching to the dis-
continuation equilibrium will make the principal worse off. Note however that
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if her failure cost was less, she would have ignored the interim news. There-
fore, if institutional arrangements permit, she would be better off by delegating
the decision rights to a person with cj < c, thus committing to ignore the in-
terim news. Conversely, suppose p > c+k1+c and β is just below β1. It is possible
that both continuation and discontinuation equilibria can exist. Suppose for
concreteness, that the players are stuck in the continuation equilibrium. The
principal would be then better off by delegating the decision rights to some
cj > c thus committing to cancel the reform if there is a bad news. Hence we
obtain the following proposition:13
Proposition 7 1. When p ≤ k, whenever the interim news makes the prin-
cipal worse off, she prefers delegating the decision rights to a person with
cj = 0
2. When p ≥ c+k1+c , there exists some η1 > 0 such that for all β ∈ (β1−η1, β1),
if originally the players are in a continuation equilibrium, the principal
prefers delegating the decision rights to a person with cj = c1.
5 Discussion
5.1 When k ≤ 1
2
When k ≤ 12 , there is an extra type of informative equilibrium. In this infor-
mative equilibrium, which we might name Initiation Equilibrium, the principal
always starts the reform regardless of the message, but would revert back to the
status quo if she gets n = b and the message sent by the expert was m = 0. To
save space, we will not fully characterize the existence conditions for this type
of equilibrium, but explore the intuition behind the equilibrium strategy of the
L-type expert, which we denote by tI∗Ls. A detailed mathematical treatment is
in the appendix. (H type expert still tells the truth. The proof for this is very
similar to that for Lemma 1.)
As stated, the principal starts the reform in the initiation equilibrium irre-
spective of the message. Now imagine β → 1. From the expert’s perspective,
the game is effectively the same as the benchmark case because the principal
will inevitably get to know the true state (even if she cancels the reform later).
Therefore, when β is very large, the L type expert must always tell the truth in
13If we also retains Assumption 3, then the following proposition will change just like in the
previous subsection. Instead of p < k and p > c+k
1+c
, the results hold respectively for p smaller
and greater than pˆ.
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equilibrium. In fact, it can be shown that this is true for all
β ≥ r(1− p)
p[r + (1− r)(2p− 1)]
If the above inequality does not hold, the L type expert has an incentive to
lie if s = 1. (But he will truthfully report his s = 0 signal.) Let tI∗L1 be the
probability that he reports m = 1 when s = 1 in the initiation equilibrium.
It can be shown that tI∗L1 ≥ tc∗L1, so that the L type expert would recommend
the reform more often than in the CE. Because the principal will initiate the
reform anyway, misreporting s = 1 is now less attractive as there is an increased
probability of being caught compared to the CE. In addition, the principal has
more knowledge about the true state when β is higher.
We now turn to the question of the principal’s welfare when β becomes
larger. Suppose at β = 0 and a CE exists. As before, let
q1 =
1
2
[r + (1− r)t∗L1]
q0 =
1
2
[r + (1− r)(2− t∗L1)]
respectively denote the ex ante probability that the principal gets m = 1 and
m = 0. Then, in the initiation equilibrium, the payoff of the principal is
WI = q
I
1 [α
I∗
1 − (1− αI∗1 )c− k] + qI0 [αI∗0 β − k]
Recall that her payoff in the CE is given by
Wc = q
c
1[α
c∗
1 − (1− αc∗1 )c− k]
Recall that ∂Wc∂tc∗L1
< 0 if p < c+k1+c . Since t
I∗
L1 > t
c∗
L1, a sufficient condition for the
principal to be worse off with the interim news is p < c+k1+c and α
I∗
0 β − k → 0.
Here we give a numerical example of an initiation equilibrium using a small
value of k = 0.09. Let r = 0.1, c = 1.31 and p = 0.6 and initially let β =
0. We can calculate that in the continuation equilibrium, tc∗L1 = 0.9630 and
αc∗1 = 0.6414 >
c+k
1+c = 0.6061. (She does not start the reform with m = 0 as
αc∗0 = 0.4645 <
c+k
1+c .) The expected payoff of the principal is Wc = 0.0395.
Now let β = 0.25. One can verify that in the initiation equilibrium, tI∗L1 = 1,
αI∗1 = 0.64 and α
I∗
0 = 0.36. To check that the principal indeed cancels the
reform only after m = 0, note that 1− (1−αI∗1 )c
αI∗1
= 0.26 > β > 0 > 1− (1−αI∗0 )c
αI∗0
.
To see that the principal will start the reform with either message, note that
αI∗1 = 0.64 >
c+k
1+c and α
I∗
0 β = 0.09 = k. Finally, we can calculate that the
expected payoff the principal is WI = 0.0392 < Wc.
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5.2 Unequal priors
Our assumption of equal prior means that the H-type expert is equally likely
to get both signals. Therefore getting a particular signal is not an indication of
smartness. Hence, the L-type expert has an incentive to recommend the status
quo only because he is less likely to be exposed if it is chosen. With unequal
prior, however, the H type expert is more likely to see one signal than the other;
hence the L type expert’s signalling incentive is more complicated. However,
we can show that the L-type expert would continue to have incentive to ‘hide’
behind the message m = 0 as long as the prior is not too close to ω = 1. We
will only discuss the case of continuation equilibrium, as the intuition for the
discontinuation equilibrium is very similar.
Let pi ∈ (0, 1) be the prior that ω = 1. If pi < 12 , an H-type expert is more
likely to receive s = 0. Therefore, reporting m = 0 is a signal of being the
H-type and this increases the incentive for the L-type expert to recommend the
status quo even further. The opposite argument would indicate that if pi > 12 , it
will be less attractive for the L-type expert to misreport his s = 1 signal. But
by continuity, if pi is not too far above 12 , we still have t
c∗
L1 < 1 in equilibrium.
To see the above arguments more formally, note that in a candidate truth-
telling equilibrium, the posterior reputation for making the correct m = 1 rec-
ommendation and recommending m = 0 are, respectively,
r
r + (1− r)p and
r
r + (1− r)[ pi1−pi (1− p) + p]
while an incorrect m = 1 recommendation results in rˆ = 0. The L-type expert
will deviate and misreport the signal s = 1 if and only if
ppi
ppi + (1− p)(1− pi)
r
r + (1− r)p <
r
r + (1− r)[ pi1−pi (1− p) + p]
The above is equivalent to(
pi
1− pi
)2
< 1 +
r
(1− r)p
The inequality holds for pi ≤ 12 . Therefore, the L-type expert will misreport
s = 1 with positive probability as long as pi is not too much larger than 12 .
5.3 Expert with outcome concern
Suppose the expert also cares about the profitability of the reform, W. In this
case, his misreporting incentive will be mitigated, and the L type expert’s report-
ing strategy t∗L1 in the informative equilibria will move closer to the principal’s
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preferred one. However, our qualitative results still remain unchanged as long
as the expert does not put too much weight on the outcome.
We illustrate the effect of outcome concern using the CE. (The same argu-
ment goes through with the DE.) Recall that in the CE, the principal would like
the L type expert always to truthfully report his signal if p ≥ c+k1+c . Otherwise,
she would prefer that he never recommends a reform. For the L type expert,
he also knows that following his s = 1 signal, the expected return of the reform
is non-negative if and only if p ≥ c+k1+c . Thus, with outcome concerns, the L
type expert has more incentive to report his s = 1 signal if and only if p ≥ c+k1+c .
Therefore, compared to the main model where the expert cares only about his
reputation, now in the CE, t∗L1 is larger (resp. smaller) if p is greater (resp.
smaller) than c+k1+c . This is exactly what the principal prefers.
6 Conclusion
This paper tries to understand two inter-related aspects of decision processes
that use noisy information input from experts. The first is the role of those
actions that block ex-post verification of the state of the world. These actions
often come up as meaningful options in important public and private decisions.
For example, not drilling at a site is an option that would block information on
whether oil actually existed there; not raiding a hideout will make it impossible
to know if the enemy uses it as shelter, and so on. If a principal is advised such
an action and acts accordingly, then she cannot retrospectively verify the quality
of the advice. This is an advantage for poor quality experts. A principal who
does not know the quality of her advisors for sure, has to take this into account
even as she uses their advice. This would leave its mark on the decisions taken,
expected success of the decisions and the expected payoff of the principal.
The second issue, and that is the central concern of the paper, arises from
this context quite naturally: is it possible to improve the decision by using a
second opinion/ interim news? While common sense suggests that a second
opinion cannot harm, we have shown that it is seriously misleading in this
context. Even assuming that the source of the second opinion is non-strategic,
it could hurt the principal if it is not sufficiently accurate.
How experts expect the principal to act after getting the second opinion has
important effect on their advising strategy. When the principal is expected to
cancel an action (that can potentially reveal the state) if the interim news is
adverse, less well informed experts are encouraged to recommend that action
more often. So, having access to an interim news would in fact reduce the
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principal’s welfare if those experts’ information is sufficiently coarse and the
second opinion not very accurate. Further, again contrary to common sense
expectation, improvement in the quality of second opinion may not necessarily
benefit the principal. Even when the principal retracts from the action after
bad interim news (in the DE), her payoff does not monotonically rise with the
accuracy of the interim news. Those findings have important implications on
practical policy making. For example, monitoring institutions that governments
set up to provide interim feedback on policy initiatives may do more harm than
merely wasting public resources, unless they house very accurate professional
expertise.
Since much depends on what experts expect the principal to do after getting
the interim news, we explored the possibilities if the principal could pre-commit
to act in a particular way. In some contexts a natural way of pre-committing
is to delegate the action choice to other persons who have different preference
parameters. In the formal model we tried to capture it by the difference in the
cost of failure. We have shown that the principal can improve expected payoff
by delegating to others with higher or lower costs. We may provide an example
here. A government sponsored project is being debated. The decision to go for
it or not will be taken through a process like we outlined in our model: first an
expert opinion and then, if it is started, an interim report on it. Suppose now
that this project is a pet project of a particular minister who is known as its
champion. If the project is taken up and fails, his personal cost would be large
as it might cost him even his political career. His cabinet colleagues however
would suffer smaller costs in case the project is wrongly chosen. The mechanism
we examined would suggest a possible delegation of the decision making by the
minister to some of his ministerial colleagues with lower cost of failure.
A Proofs
We first introduce some formal notations. Recall that the information available
to the principal at the end of the game depends on her own choices and will
be denoted by I = {m, ωˆ, nˆ} . The principal always gets a report m from
the expert. Her information about the true state of the world is denoted by
ωˆ ∈ {1, 0,ω}. If the principal initiates the reform and sticks to it until the
end, she will know the true state by observing the return. (ω = 1 if and only
if Y = 1.) If the reform is not initiated or canceled after the interim news,
the principal always gets Y = 0 and she will not know the true state (hence
ωˆ = ω). The possible interim news the principal might receive is denoted
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by nˆ ∈ {g, b,n}. If the principal has chosen the status quo at the beginning
(x1 = 0), she is not going to receive any news so nˆ = n.
We let Uis(m) denote the i-type agent’s expected payoff from reporting m if
he gets signal s.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We first explicitly write the principal’s posterior assessment of the
expert.
rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) =
r
r + (1− r)[ptL1 + (1− p)tL0] ≥ r (A1)
rˆ(0, 0,n) = r
r + (1− r)[p(1− tL0) + (1− p)(1− tL1)] ≥ r (A2)
rˆ(1, 0, nˆ) = rˆ(0, 1, nˆ) = 0
When s = 1
UL1(1) = prˆ(1, 1, nˆ) and UL1(0) = (1− p)rˆ(0, 0,n)
If s = 0,
UL0(1) = (1− p)rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) and UL0(0) = prˆ(0, 0,n)
To prove that the L-type strictly prefers to tell the truth, it suffices to show
that UL1(1) > UL1(0) and UL0(0) > UL0(1). Suppose not and, for example, let
UL1(1) ≤ UL1(0). Since p > 12 , we must then have rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) < rˆ(0, 0,n). But
then it must follow that UL0(0) > UL0(1) and the L-type expert will strictly
prefer reporting m = 0 when s = 0, i.e., tL0 = 0. Substituting into (A1) and
(A2), we have
rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) =
r
r + (1− r)ptL1 ≥ rˆ(0, 0,n) =
r
r + (1− r)[p+ (1− p)(1− tL1)]
for all tL1 ∈ [0, 1], which is a contradiction. A similar argument rules out the
possibility that UL0(0) ≤ UL0(1).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. First note the principal’s posterior assessments of the expert, given his
strategies, are
rˆ(1, 0, b) = 0 14 (A3)
14Strictly speaking, since we assume that the H type expert gets a perfect information, we
need to consider the off the equilibrium path event when tc∗L1 = 0, the principal receives m = 1
but the output Y = −c. We assume that in this case, the principal believes that the deviation
comes from the L-type expert. This problem will not be present if we assume instead the
H-type expert’s signal is also noisy.
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rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) =
r
r + (1− r)(ptcL1 + (1− p)tcL0)
(A4)
rˆ(0,ω,n) = r
r + (1− r)(2− tcL1 − tcL0)
15 (A5)
We first establish that tc∗L0 = 0. Suppose t
c∗
L0 > 0. This means that if the L-type
expert gets s = 0, his payoff from sending m = 1 is
UL0(1) = (1− p)rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) ≥ rˆ(0,ω,n)
At s = 1, his expected payoff by sending m = 1 is
prˆ(1, 1, nˆ) > (1− p)rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) ≥ rˆ(0,x,n)
and thus tc∗L1 = 1. But then for all t
c∗
L1 > 0,
prˆ(1, 1, nˆ) =
pr
r + (1− r)(p+ (1− p)tc∗L0)
which is less than
rˆ(0,ω,n) = r
r + (1− r)(1− tc∗L0)
and we have a contradiction.
Now suppose the L-type expert gets s = 1. Given tc∗L0 = 0, his expected
payoffs from reporting m = 1 and m = 0 are, respectively,
UL1(1) = prˆ(1, 1, nˆ) + (1− p)rˆ(1, 0, b) = pr
r + (1− r)ptcL1
UL1(0) = rˆ(0,ω,n) = r
r + (1− r)(2− tcL1)
When tcL1 = 1, UL1(1) < UL1(0) since p < 1. Therefore, a necessary condition
for equilibrium is that he is just indifferent between sending either message.
That is, there needs to be a tc∗L1 such that
pr
r + (1− r)ptc∗L1
=
r
r + (1− r)(2− tc∗L1)
(A6)
It is easy to verify that if p > r2−r , there exists a unique t
c∗
L1 = 1− r(1−p)2p(1−r) such
that the above holds as equality. If p ≤ r2−r , the above can never hold for any
tc∗L1 > 0.
16
15To understand the denominator, note that if the expert is L-type, in state 1, he sends
m = 0 with probability p(1 − tcL1) + (1 − p)(1 − tcL0). In state 0, he sends m = 0 with
probability p(1 − tcL0) + (1 − p)(1 − tcL1). The expression then follows from our assumption
that each state is equally likely.
16The result that tc∗L1 = 0 for all p ≤ r2−r is due to our assumption that the H type
expert gets a perfect signal as well as the belief off the equilibrium path discussed in the
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. First note that if the principal cancels the reform after a bad news, her
assessment on the expert is
rˆ(1,ω, b) = r(1− β)
r(1− β) + (1− r)[(ptdL1 + (1− p)tdL0)(1− β) + ((1− p)tdL1 + ptdL0)]
(A7)
We omit the proof for td∗L0 = 0 and t
d∗
L1 < 1 as they are very similar to that in
Proposition 3. As in proposition 3, the level of td∗L1 is determined by equating
the expert’s expected payoff of reporting m = 1 and m = 0 when s = 1, which
are, respectively,
UL1(1) = pβrˆ(1, 1, nˆ) + (1− pβ)rˆ(0,ω, b)
=
pβr
r + (1− r)ptd∗L1
+
(1− pβ)r
r + (1− r)[p+ 1−p1−β ]td∗L1
UL1(0) =
r
r + (1− r)(2− td∗L1)
It is easy to see that ∂UL1(1)
∂td∗L1
< 0 and one can verify, after some algebra, that
∂UL1(1)
∂β < 0. Thus
∂td∗L1
∂β < 0.
Note that when β = 1, rˆ(0,ω, b) = rˆ(1, 0, b), so that UL1(1) is the same
as that in the CE and we have td∗L1 = t
c∗
L1. It then follows that for all β < 1,
td∗L1 > t
c∗
L1.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Recall that without the interim news, the principal’s expected payoff is
given by
Wc = q1(t
c∗
L1)[α
c∗
1 − (1− αc∗1 )c− k]
previous footnote. If we assume instead that the H type expert also has noisy information,
with pL < pH < 1, in equilibrium we have 0 < t
c∗
L1 < 1, t
c∗
L0 = 0 and the H type always
reports truthfully. Therefore, our main result that the L-type expert misreports his s = 1
stays unchanged. The part that H-type reports truthfully even with noisy signals is proven
in Appendix B. The proof for tc∗L0 = 0 is similar to the one above. To see that 0 < t
c∗
L1 < 1,
note that now
rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) =
rpH
rpH + (1− r)pLtc∗L1
rˆ(1, 0, b) =
r(1− pH)
r(1− pH) + (1− r)(1− pL)tc∗L1
and rˆ(0,ω ,n) remains the same as before (due to equal prior). Now one can easily verify
that there exists a unique tc∗L1 ∈ (0, 1) so that UL1(1) = UL1(0).
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By construction, at β = β1, the principal is just indifferent between cancelling
the reform or not after a bad news, that is,
Wc = q1(t
c∗
L1)[α
c∗
1 − (1− αc∗1 )c− k]
= q1(t
c∗
L1)[α
c∗
1 β1 − k] = Wd(tc∗L1)
Let δ > 0. When β = β1 + δ, the continuation equilibrium no longer exists.
Taking δ → 0, The principal’s expected payoff in the discontinuation equilibrium
is
Wd|β1 = q1(td∗L1)[αd∗1 β1 − k]
Part 1 It has already been established in the text that ∂Wd
∂td∗L1
> 0 if and only
if pβ > k. Since td∗L1 > t
c∗
L1, Wd|β1 ≥ Wc if and only if pβ1 ≥ k. If p ≤ k,
clearly, this is not possible as β1 < 1. Therefore, for all p ≤ k, Wd|β1 < Wc. We
have noted in eq(11) and the discussion that follows that Wd is monotonically
increasing in β when p ≤ k. Further, at β = 1, td∗L1 = tc∗L1 and it must follow
that Wd|β=1 > Wc. Therefore, there exists some 0 > 0 such that Wd < Wc if
and only if β ∈ (β1, β1 + 0).
Part 2 Suppose p ≥ c+k1+c . Since β1 = 1 − (1−α
c∗
1 )c
αc∗1
, and αc∗1 >
c+k
1+c by
assumption 1, it follows that β1 >
k(1+c)
k+c and pβ1 > k. Hence, for all β ≥ β1,
(Note that td∗L1, and consequently, α
d∗
1 depends on β)
Wd|β = q1(td∗L1(β))[αd∗1 (β)β − k]
≥ q1(td∗L1(β))[αd∗1 (β)β1 − k]
> q1(t
c∗
L1)[α
c∗
1 β1 − k]
= Wc
where the second last line follows because td∗L1 > t
c∗
L1 and pβ1 > k (Thus the
expression is increasing in t∗L1). Thus the principal is always strictly better off
by receiving the interim news with β ≥ β1.
A.5 Proof of Remark 1
Proof. Part 1 When β < β1,
Wd(β) = q1(t
d∗
L1(β))[α
d∗
1 (β)β − k]
≤ q1(td∗L1(β))[αd∗1 (β)β1 − k]
< q1(t
c∗
L1)[α
c∗
1 β1 − k] = Wc
where the inequality in the last line follows as pβ1 < k and t
c∗
L1 < t
d∗
L1(β).
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Part 2 Following part 2 of the previous proof, consider some 1 > 0. Let
1 → 0, assumption 1 guarantees the existence of the discontinuation equilibrium
for β ∈ (β1 − 1, β1). In the DE, the principal’s payoff is Wd|β . When p > c+k1+c ,
we have Wd|β1 > Wc. By continuity, Wd|β > Wc for β ∈ (β1 − 1, β1) when 1
is sufficiently small.
A.6 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. Following the proof of proposition 6, we know that when p < k, pβ1 < k
and when p > c+k1+c , pβ1 > k. When r < r
∗, we have ∂α
c∗
1
∂p > 0 and thus
∂β1(p)
∂p > 0. Hence by continuity, there must exist a unique pˆ ∈ (k, c+k1+c ), such
that pˆβ1(pˆ) = k. The rest of the proof is almost identical to that in Proposition
6 and Remark 1 and omitted.17
A.7 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. The first part follows directly from proposition 6. Suppose the principal
is strictly worse off when the interim news is available. If the principal delegates
the decision rights to another person with cj = 0, this person will surely ignore
any interim news. Assumption 1 guarantees a continuation equilibrium exists
and the principal’s payoff is now Wc > Wd|β .
When p > c+k1+c , consider some 0 < η1 < 1 as in remark 1. For all β ∈
(β1−η1, β1), the principal’s payoff in the DE is higher than Wc. If she delegates
the decision rights to cj = c1 > c, by making η1 → 0, either αc∗1 < c1+k1+c1 , or
β1 − η1 > 1 − (1−α
c∗
1 )c1
αc∗1
, so that the CE is not possible. The existence of the
discontinuation equilibrium is guaranteed by assumption 1. (The DE payoffs
to both the new decision maker and the principal are independent of c as the
failure cost is always avoided.) Following remark 1, for all β ∈ (β1− η1, β1), the
principal is strictly better off as Wd|β > Wc.
A.8 Calculations for the case k ≤ 1
2
When the L type expert gets s = 1, his expected payoffs from reporting m = 1
or m = 0 are, respectively
UL1(1) = prˆ(1, 1, nˆ) and UL1(0) = (1− pβ)rˆ(0,ω, b)
17The only difference is that the set of β above β1 that makes the principal strictly worse
off when p < pˆ is not necessarily convex. This is because Wd is not necessarily monotonically
increasing in β in this case. See the discussion in the main text.
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When s = 0, the payoffs are
UL0(1) = (1− p)rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) and UL0(0) = (1− (1− p)β)rˆ(0,ω, b)
The standard argument shows that tI∗L0 = 0 so that he always truthfully reports
his s = 0 signal. This implies that the principal’s posterior belief on the expert
is
rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) =
r
r + (1− r)ptI∗L1
and
rˆ(0,ω, b) = r
r + (1− r)[(p(1− tI∗L1) + (1− p))(1− β) + ((1− p)(1− tI∗L1) + p)]
The L-type expert reports m = 1 with positive probability if and only if
prˆ(1, 1, nˆ) ≥ (1− pβ)rˆ(0,ω, b) (A8)
The LHS of the above equation is exactly the same as that in eq(A6), but the
RHS is strictly smaller than that in eq(A6). Therefore, we know that tI∗L1 > t
c∗
L1.
In fact, by solving ineq(A8), one can find that tI∗L1 = 1 if and only if
(p+ pβ − 1)r ≥ (1− r)pβ(1− 2p)
.
B Proof of Lemma 1
In order to show that our characterisation of the informative equilibria is robust,
we present the proof for more general settings. We consider the case where
the H-type expert also gets noisy signals and allow for the possibility that the
principal might randomise over both the initiation and cancellation choices. Let
pi denote the probability that the type i agent’s signal correctly matches the
true state, where 1 > pH > pL >
1
2 . In addition, we maintain the assumption
k > 12 . A similar, but tedious proof will go through when k ≤ 12 . We present the
proof to the case where the state is not revealed and focus on discontinuation
equilibrium. The proof for other cases are very similar by making suitable
changes.
Proof. Step 1 We first show that in any informative equilibrium, the principal
randomises with at most one signal at the initiation stage. In particular, under
the assumption that k > 12 , she initiates the reform with positive probability
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only after m = 1.18 First, the principal’s posterior belief of ω = 1 is
α1 =
r(pHtH1 + (1− pH)tH0) + (1− r)(pLtL1 + (1− pL)tL0)
r(tH0 + tH1) + (1− r)(tL0 + tL1)
α0 =
r[pH(1− tH1) + (1− pH)(1− tH0)] + (1− r)[pL(1− tL1) + (1− pL)(1− tL0)]
r(2− tH1 − tH0) + (1− r)(2− tL0 − tL1)
Suppose the principal initiates the reform with positive probability following
both messages. We must have α1 >
1
2 and α0 >
1
2 because k >
1
2 . α1 >
1
2
implies that
(2pH − 1)r(tH1 − tH0) + (2pL − 1)(1− r)(tL1 − tL0) > 0
but α0 >
1
2 implies that
(2pH − 1)r(tH1 − tH0) + (2pL − 1)(1− r)(tL1 − tL0) < 0
Hence we arrive at a contradiction. Hence at least one of the αm ≤ 12 in the
informative equilibrium and without loss of generality, we take this to be α0.
Thus, we let γ1 be the probability that the principal initiates the reform
after m = 1 and γ2 be the probability that she continues with the reform after
getting the bad news.
Step 2 We now prove that the H-type expert cannot randomise at both
signals. Suppose he gets s = 1. By reporting m = 1, his expected payoff is
UH1(1) = γ1[pH [(β + (1− β)γ2)rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) + (1− β)(1− γ2)rˆ(1,ω, b)]+
(1− pH)[γ2rˆ(1, 0, b) + (1− γ2)rˆ(1,ω, b)]] + (1− γ1)rˆ(1,ω,n)
When he gets s = 0 and by reporting m = 1, his expected payoff is
UH0(1) = γ1[(1− pH)[(β + (1− β)γ2)rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) + (1− β)(1− γ2)rˆ(1,ω, b)]
+ pH [γ2rˆ(1, 0, b) + (1− γ2)rˆ(1,ω, b)]] + (1− γ1)rˆ(1,ω,n)
In both cases, if he reports m = 0, he gets
UH1(0) = UH0(0) = rˆ(0,ω,n)
Now if the H type expert does randomise at both signals, it implies that
UH1(1) = UH0(1) = rˆ(0,ω,n)
18When k < 1
2
, she still randomises at at most one signal. But it is possible that she always
start the reform with m = 1 and randomises at m = 0. But the method of proof in the
following parts remains qualitatively similar.
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Upon some algebraic manipulation, this is equivalent to
[β(1− γ2) + γ2]rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) = β(1− γ2)rˆ(1,ω, b) + γ2rˆ(1, 0, b) (B1)
By the second criterion of our informative equilibria, we cannot have rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) =
rˆ(1, 0, b). Otherwise we get19
rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) = rˆ(1, 0, b) = rˆ(0,ω,n)
But together with UH1(1) = UH0(1) = rˆ(0,ω,n) this would mean that
rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) = rˆ(1, 0, b) = rˆ(1,ω, b) = rˆ(1,ω,n) = rˆ(0,ω,n)
which means that the principal’s posterior on the expert will never change. Now
suppose rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) > rˆ(1, 0, b). But this implies that rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) > rˆ(1,ω, b) >
rˆ(1, 0, b) and eq(B1) cannot hold. A similar argument shows that we cannot
have rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) < rˆ(1, 0, b). Hence it is impossible for the H-type to randomise
at both signals in an informative equilibrium.
Step 3 Finally, we rule out the possibility that the H-type expert randomises
at just one signal. Suppose he randomises at s = 1 but truthfully reports at
s = 0. This implies that
UH1(1) = rˆ(0,ω,n) > UH0(1)
which is equivalent to
(β + (1− β)γ2)rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) + (1− β)(1− γ2)rˆ(1,ω, b)
> γ2rˆ(1, 0, b) + (1− γ2)rˆ(1,ω, b)
Note that the arguments in the previous part ensures that UH1(1) > UH0(1),
as strict equality would lead to eq(B1), which is shown to be impossible. Now
consider the incentive for the L-type expert. When he gets s = 1
UL1(1) = γ1[pL[(β + (1− β)γ2)rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) + (1− β)(1− γ2)rˆ(1,ω, b)]+
(1− pL)[γ2rˆ(1, 0, b) + (1− γ2)rˆ(1,ω, b)]] + (1− γ1)rˆ(1,ω,n)
< UH1(1) = rˆ(0,ω,n)
19To see this, we explicitly write out the full expression
rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) =
r[pH tH1 + (1− pH)tH0]
r[pH tH1 + (1− pH)tH0] + (1− r)[pLtL1 + (1− pL)tL0]
rˆ(1, 0, b) =
r[(1− pH)tH1 + pH tH0]
r[(1− pH)tH1 + pH tH0] + (1− r)[(1− pL)tL1 + pLtL0]
rˆ(1,ω , b) = r[(1− pH)tH1 + pH tH0] + (1− β)r[pH tH1 + (1− pH)tH0]
[r[(1− pH)tH1 + pH tH0] + (1− r)[(1− pL)tL1 + pLtL0]]+
(1− β)[r[(1− pH)tH1 + pH tH0] + (1− r)[(1− pL)tL1 + pLtL0]]
Note that the denominator and numerator of rˆ(1,ω , b) consist of, respectively, a weight sum
of the denominator and numerator of rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) and rˆ(1, 0, b).
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since pL < pH . Hence the L-type expert strictly prefers reporting m = 0. When
he gets s = 0, it is easy to check that
UL0(1) < UL1(1) < rˆ(0,ω,n)
since pL >
1
2 . This means that the L-type expert will never report m = 1 and
we must have
rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) = rˆ(1, 0, b) = rˆ(1,ω, b) = rˆ(1,ω,n) = 1 = rˆ(0,ω,n)
which again is impossible.20 A similar argument rules out the possibility that
the H-type randomises at s = 0 only. This completes the proof.
C Symmetric information on the expert’s type
When the expert does not know his type, the game is different because experts
would not be involved in signalling. Instead, misreporting now arises from the
experts’ incentive to conform to the signal which is ex ante more likely. (See
Prat(2005) for a related study.) To model this environment, denote the prior
probability that the expert is H-type by r. Assume that an H-type expert
always gets a perfect signal, but an L-type expert gets both signals with equal
probability regardless of the state. The results discussed below do not change
if they too get informative signals.
Neither the principal nor the expert know the latter’s type. We let ρ =
r + (1 − r) 12 denote the ex ante probability that the expert gets the correct
signal. In order to get some general results, we let the prior on ω = 1 be
pi ∈ (0, 1) and assume that ρ > max{pi, 1 − pi}. This assumption means that
the expert’s signal is reasonably good so that by following it, the probability of
being correct exceeds 12 . Without this assumption, it is even less likely that the
expert will tell the truth.
To keep things simple, we maintain the assumption that k > 12 so that the
principal would not start the reform without the expert’s advice for it. We
also bypass the discussion of the existence of informative equilibria (existence
conditions will be similar to those in the main model), but only investigate
the expert’s equilibrium strategy. Further, we focus on the discontinuation
20In the main text, we assume that pH = 1, which means that it is possible that in the con-
tinuation equilibrium tc∗L1 = 0. We assume that the off the equilibrium path belief rˆ(1, 0, b) = 0.
However, it is easy to see that in the main text, in the continuation equilibrium the H-type ex-
pert cannot be randomising over s = 1 only. If he does so, it means rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) = rˆ(0,ω ,n).
For the low expert, prˆ(1, 1, nˆ) < rˆ(0,ω ,n) and he will never report m = 1. Now we have
rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) = 1 = rˆ(0,ω ,n) < 1, which is not possible.
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equilibrium, since the equilibrium strategy in the CE is the same as that in DE
with β = 1.
This model environment has the following properties.
Proposition 8 1. When pi < 12 , there does not exist any informative equi-
librium.
2. When pi = 12 , there exists an informative equilibrium where the expert
always truthfully reports his signals.
3. When pi > 12 , there exists a discontinuation equilibrium where the expert
always truthfully reports his signals only if β is sufficiently large. Other-
wise, there cannot be a discontinuation equilibrium where the expert always
truthfully reports his s = 0 signal. In the continuation equilibrium, the ex-
pert always tells the truth.
These results are somewhat striking. Especially, the first part of the proposi-
tion implies that if the prior on the state is biased towards ω = 0 by just a little
bit, the expert will never truthfully reveal his signal (even probabilistically), no
matter how good his prior reputation is. To see the line of reasoning, note that
if ω = 0 is more likely, then an H-type expert is more likely to receive s = 0.
Now suppose there is a truth-telling equilibrium. If the expert gets s = 0, his
belief on himself being smart must go up, and so is the principal’s after getting
m = 0 (by assumption of truth telling). On the other hand, his belief on him-
self being smart must drop if he gets s = 1, which is ex ante less likely to be
obtained by H-type experts. Because the information on the expert’s type is
symmetrical, the expert knows that if he sends m = 1 and the principal carries
out the reform, his expected reputation must be less than r. Since the status
quo choice would not reveal the true state, the expert will rather deviate and
report m = 0 instead, because in the truth telling equilibrium, the principal’s
belief on him will be higher than r. (One might wonder whether the value of β
will make a difference, or whether there could be a mixed strategy informative
equilibrium. The proof of Proposition 8 will show that the answer is negative.)
Therefore, when the information about experts’ type is symmetric, any prior
bias towards ω = 0 will result in complete disappearance of informative equi-
libria. Of course, this very strong result depends on the assumption that the
expert cares only about reputation. If he has some concern about the output,
then truth telling is possible if p is sufficiently large. He may, for example, bet
that ω = 1 after s = 1 and hence recommend the reform if he cares sufficiently
about the output.
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The second part of the proposition says that when the prior on the state
is just balanced, there always exists a truth telling equilibrium. This is quite
expected following the intuition from the previous paragraph. Balanced prior
means that both signals are equally likely to be received by the H-type. There-
fore, the expert’s belief in himself remains constant at r after receiving either
message. Given symmetric information, this is also the rating he expects to
get from the principal regardless of whether the reform is chosen or not. This
means that he does not have an incentive to misreport.
When pi > 12 , the signal s = 0 becomes the ‘bad’ signal. This means that
the expert is willing to report s = 1 truthfully but might want to misreport
m = 0 in the discontinuation equilibrium. (In the continuation equilibrium
this will not happen because the principal always gets to see the state after
the reform is undertaken. So far as the expert’s incentive is concerned, the
continuation equilibrium is the same as the discontinuation equilibrium with
β = 1.) However, when β is large, the principal is very certain about the state
after a bad news and the expert would not want to lie when s = 0. Only when
β is low, so that a bad news does not convey much information about the true
state, does the incentive of misreporting becomes dominant. 21
How is the principal’s welfare affected as the interim news becomes more
accurate? It is obvious that when pi < 12 , there is no effect, because there can
not be an informative equilibrium. When pi = 12 , a higher β always benefits the
principal as the expert always tells the truth. But when pi > 12 , the principal’s
payoff can fall when β is higher. When β = 0, the expert will always tell
the truth in the continuation equilibrium, conditional on its existence. Now
suppose β increases to some intermediate value. It is possible from the above
proposition that the expert misreports s = 0 with positive probability if the
players enter the discontinuation equilibrium. If so, this must unambiguously
lower the principal’s welfare, because at s = 0, the principal’s expected payoff
from the reform is negative. (If an informative equilibrium does not exist, then
the principal will never start a reform in a babbling equilibrium so that her
payoff is zero, which is lower than that in the continuation equilibrium.)
C.1 Proof of proposition 8
Proof. We will prove only part (1) and part (3), the result in part 2 is straight-
forward after part (1). Since now the information on type is symmetric, we let
ts denote the probability the expert sends m = 1 after getting signal s. Also,
21The question of existence of a mixed strategy informative equilibrium is quite messy. We
do not pursue it here as it does not add too much extra qualitative insight.
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note that we assumed that the messages have their natural “meaning”. Thus
we can assume without loss of generality that t1 > t0, as otherwise, one can sim-
ply re-label the messages. Given the expert’s strategy, the principal’s posterior
belief on his type is
rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) =
rt1
ρt1 + (1− ρ)t0
rˆ(1,ω, b) = r[pi(1− β)t1 + (1− pi)t0]
[ρpi(1− β) + (1− ρ)(1− pi)]t1 + [ρ(1− pi) + pi(1− ρ)(1− β)]t0
22
rˆ(0,ω,n) = r[pi(1− t1) + (1− pi)(1− t0)]
[piρ+ (1− pi)(1− ρ)](1− t1) + [pi(1− ρ) + ρ(1− pi)](1− t0)
Part (1) pi < 12 : First, using an argument very similar to that in the proof
of proposition 2, we can establish that t∗0 = 0.
23 Now suppose the expert gets
s = 1, by assumption of informative equilibrium, if he reports m = 1, the reform
is carried out and his expected payoff is
U1(1) =
rpiβ
piρ+ (1− pi)(1− ρ)
+ (1− piρβ
piρ+ (1− pi)(1− ρ) )
rpi(1− β)
ρpi(1− β) + (1− ρ)(1− pi)
=
rpi
piρ+ (1− ρ)(1− pi)
On the other hand, his expected payoff from reporting m = 0 is
U1(0) =
r[pi(1− t1) + (1− pi)]
[piρ+ (1− pi)(1− ρ)](1− t1) + [pi(1− ρ) + ρ(1− pi)]
Note that U1(0) is increasing in t1 and minU1(0) =
r(1−pi)
ρ(1−pi)+pi(1−ρ) > U1(1).
Thus it follows that the expert will not report m = 1 and there can be no
informative equilibrium when pi < 12 .
24
Part (3) pi > 12 : Similar to the case of Part 1, one can establish that t
∗
1 = 1
in an informative equilibrium. Suppose the expert always tells the truth in the
informative equilibrium, one needs to show that t∗0 = 0 and this means that
U0(1) =
pi(1− ρ)β
pi(1− ρ) + ρ(1− pi)
r
ρ
+ (1− pi(1− ρ)β)
pi(1− ρ) + ρ(1− pi) )
piρ(1− β)
piρ(1− β) + (1− ρ)(1− pi)
r
ρ
≤ U0(0) = r(1− pi)
ρ(1− pi) + pi(1− ρ)
22In the case of continuation equilibrium, one lets β = 1 and rˆ(1,ω , b) = rˆ(1, 0, nˆ)
23This proof is quite tedious, but relies on the fact that t1 > t0 implies that rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) >
rˆ(1,ω , b)
24The proof for Part (2) is simple: One can verify that if pi = 1
2
, U1(1) = U1(0) if t1 = 1.
Together with t0 = 0, this establishes the existence of a truth telling equilibrium.
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One can verify that U0(1) is decreasing in β. At β = 1, U0(1) < U0(0) and at
β = 0, U0(1) > U0(0). (Recall that ρ > max{pi, 1− pi}.) Therefore there exists
some β˜ at which U0(1) = U0(0). It follows that for all β > β˜, in the DE, the
expert always tells the truth. Otherwise, in the DE (if it exists at all), t∗0 > 0.
The proof for the continuation equilibrium is straightforward. Simply note that
in terms of the expert’s reputation, the CE is equivalent to the DE with β = 1.
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